Over the past week, French diplomacy has been particularly active on the Lebanese file. On April 18, European Union leaders adopted a common position on Lebanon after robust lobbying from Paris. A day later, President Emmanuel Macron hosted Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) chief Joseph Aoun. Previously, the French government had proposed a new Israeli-Lebanese security arrangement in March, eliciting a vague but positive official letter from Beirut, probably with Hezbollah’s approval.

These activities are in line with France’s overarching support to Lebanon and its diplomatic approach since the current cycle of Hezbollah-Israel hostilities erupted last October. Like Washington, Paris has steadily sought a diplomatic solution to prevent all-out war, sending its foreign minister, defense minister, and other high-level officials to Israel and Lebanon multiple times. French and U.S. officials have intensified their contacts lately as well, indicating that increased cooperation is on the horizon or already in motion. What are the contours of such coordination, and what goals does each ally seek to prioritize going forward?

Comparing the French and U.S. Plans

The two governments have already developed separate plans for resolving the current Lebanon crisis, and the commonalities between these plans are striking. Both reflect wariness about regional escalation, and both seek to build on and at least partially implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, whose terms were first adopted after the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war but never adequately enforced. Specifically, they seek:

• The withdrawal of Hezbollah’s armed personnel and some of its military capabilities away from the border.
• Large-scale LAF deployments to the south, backed by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
• An end to Israeli military overflights of Lebanese territory.
• New Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on delimiting their land border.

Paris and Washington’s parameters for these elements differ only slightly—for example, the French plan calls for Hezbollah to move ten kilometers back from the border, while the U.S. plan calls for seven. Moreover, the American plan seems broader, reportedly combining the above elements with economic incentives, while France remains focused on security issues. Both plans are organized into three phases, but the French plan tackles the de-escalatory phase in more detail, with a short timeline for achieving the following:

1. An immediate ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.
2. Within three days, a Hezbollah withdrawal ten kilometers north of the UN-demarcated Blue Line, after which the LAF is to begin deploying south and Israeli forces are to halt overflights.
3. Within ten days, the beginning of border talks. Notably, these talks are unlikely to include the Shebaa Farms; although Hezbollah has used this disputed area as a pretext for continuing hostilities, negotiating its status would require engagement with Syria and is therefore out of bounds for now.

Moreover, France seems eager to emulate the 1996 “April understanding,” which set up a monitoring mechanism overseen by the United States, France, Lebanon, Israel, and Syria (though again, no role is envisioned for Syria in the current circumstances, and the only other international player currently capable of influencing Hezbollah—Iran—cannot play such a role either). This type of arrangement could put the future of UNIFIL’s tripartite meetings with Israeli and LAF officials in doubt—meetings that have been on hold during the Gaza war but previously served as a useful forum for exchanging information and deconflicting on issues relevant to Resolution 1701. Yet given the longstanding pressure and criticism aimed at UNIFIL, formulating a system similar to the 1996 mechanism would bring in more guarantors and might therefore improve confidence.

From Rivalry to Cooperation

There is no clear explanation why Paris and Washington have not put forward a joint initiative. Historically, however, the two allies have had a complex working relationship in Lebanon.

Sometimes their visions did not align. Back in the 1940s, Washington had to pressure Paris to grant Lebanon independence. More recently, the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy against Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies made Washington wary of France’s endeavors in Lebanon after the 2020 Beirut port explosion.

Even when their visions aligned, cooperation could still be difficult. As recounted by former French foreign minister Herve de Charette, the two countries advanced competing initiatives during Israel’s 1996 military campaign in Lebanon. Despite agreeing with the substance of French efforts, the United States and Israel insisted on a single diplomatic channel. In the end, Washington spearheaded the initiative, but Paris played an instrumental role in shaping the content of the final agreement.

In contrast, the (admittedly rare) diplomatic successes in Lebanon over the past two decades—including the 2005 Syrian withdrawal—were often the result of close French and American cooperation, and the two allies appear to be visibly coordinating on the current crisis as well. During an April 2 presser in Paris with his French counterpart, Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted, “France made proposals that were favorably received by our Lebanese partners,” implying that Washington is regularly informed about French efforts. Days later, French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Washington to discuss the situation with Blinken and U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, who worked closely with Paris on the 2022 Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement.

Indeed, Washington may rely on French help with Lebanon for several reasons. In addition to its deep historical ties there, France has 700 Blue Helmets on the ground as part of UNIFIL and is the penholder on Lebanese issues at the UN Security Council. Moreover, it can engage directly with actors across the Lebanese political scene, including Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), whose leader was sanctioned by the United States in 2020; the same goes for engagement with Iran. Washington has often used this “French channel” in the past, and it could prove more efficient in a crisis situation than relying on Lebanese intermediaries.

For Paris, U.S. leverage on Israel is evidently irreplaceable. American leverage is also needed in Lebanon, since U.S. fatigue can significantly limit the results of French diplomacy.

Prospects for Further Coordination

If an agreement is reached between Israel and Lebanon, U.S. and French officials will have to work closely at the Security Council—not only because of the role that UNIFIL and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) play on the ground, but also due to last year’s difficult UNIFIL mandate renewal, which saw Russia and China abstain from the vote in support of Beirut and Hezbollah’s request for enhanced scrutiny over the peacekeeping mission. Beijing and, to a greater extent, Moscow will likely continue such obstruction going forward, especially since Russia has been strengthening its ties with Iran during the Ukraine war.

Support to the LAF. France has seemingly begun lobbying European and Middle Eastern countries to provide additional funding for the LAF, in line with the aforementioned EU common position, which underlined the EU’s commitment to “strengthening its support” for the force. Likewise, when Qatar’s Emir Tamim visited France in February, the two governments pledged to “continue their support for the [LAF], in particular through the organization of an international conference in Paris.”

Humanitarian and development aid. Paris and Washington could build on previous donor conferences and the joint French-Saudi humanitarian fund set up after the Beirut port explosion (later joined by the United Arab Emirates). If economic incentives are envisioned in the oil and gas sector, the French company TotalEnergies could play a useful role given its previous involvement in exploring the country’s reserves.

Presidential vacancy. Paris and Washington must also remain engaged in Lebanon’s political process as part of the “Quintet” with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. This means striking a delicate balance between their short-term goals (preventing all-out war) and long-term goals (governance reform). One issue in particular—the presidential vacancy that has persisted for a year and a half, and which Hezbollah’s camp is eager to fill—will no doubt prove very difficult for Beirut to negotiate, so U.S. and French officials might be tempted to turn the post into a bargaining chip. Yet they may be better off taking a resolute and unified stance on the necessity of a “third-way candidate,” to be identified and agreed upon by Lebanese parties. The “rally round the flag” effect of recent crises with Israel has not translated into more domestic political capital for Hezbollah, which remains unable to secure a majority coalition. Even its erstwhile Christian partner, the FPM, has repeatedly rejected its preferred candidate for president, Sleiman Frangieh.

Conclusion

It remains unclear how Iran and Israel’s recent exchange of direct fire will affect the Lebanese scene diplomatically or militarily. Clashes with Hezbollah have crossed new thresholds since last week, and the cross-border fire is continuously escalating. Indeed, Israel seems bent on continuing its operations against the group until it obtains a new status quo—a goal it may pursue even if its de-escalation with Iran sticks and an elusive ceasefire is reached in Gaza. (Notably, Hezbollah views a Gaza ceasefire as an indispensable prerequisite to any agreement on standing down in Lebanon.)

As others have assessed, Hezbollah does not want all-out war at present. Yet Iran’s attack on Israel showed that the continued loss of important leaders can push the “axis of resistance” to change its calculus. French and U.S. diplomatic efforts are therefore necessarily precarious—they can fail at any moment if hostilities escalate, and even if they result in an agreement, the parties may simply use the resultant lull to better prepare for a future conflict they deem inevitable. Despite these concerns, however, there is no alternative to diligently seeking another arrangement that can help delay a destructive war, prevent the complete collapse of Lebanese institutions, and nurture reformist elements in the hope that they will be ready to take charge when regional dynamics allow it.

Selin Uysal is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute, in residence from the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs.